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Abstract 
Since the beginning of the 21st century much has been discussed regarding the 
future sustainability of the Portuguese social security system, some argue it is sustainable 
while others regard it as unsustainable. The main factors for the unsustainability of the 
system are centered in the decreasing fertility and birth rates, complemented with the 
reaching of the retirement age of the baby-boom generation. In this sense, defendants of 
the unsustainability claim that a change of paradigm should occur, namely the adoption 
of a notional-defined contribution system like the Swedish model represents the most 
viable solution, as it displays an automatic mechanism that ensures the system balance. 
To better understand if the Swedish model would be viable to the Portuguese case, 
it is developed in this master’s final work a simulation model, where the Portuguese 
system would apply the Swedish model in the same year as Sweden did. Finally, 
conclusion regarding both financial and social impact of this adoption are drawn. 
 
 
 
Key-Words: social security, pension, defined-benefit, defined-contribution, 
notional-defined-contribution, Pay-As-You-Go, fully-funded, notional pension wealth, 
automatic balancing mechanism. 
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Resumo 
Desde o início do século XXI que a sustentabilidade futura da segurança social 
portuguesa tem sido muito discutida, sendo que alguns autores argumentam que esta é 
sustentável, enquanto outros a consideram insustentável. Os principais fatores apontados 
para a insustentabilidade do sistema são as decrescentes taxas de fertilidade e de 
natalidade, bem como o alcance da idade de reforma pela geração ‘baby-boom’. Neste 
sentido, os defensores da insustentabilidade do sistema argumentam que deveria realizar-
se uma mudança de paradigma, nomeadamente a adoção de um sistema de contribuição 
nocional definida semelhante ao modelo sueco, cujo representa a solução mais viável 
dado dispor de um mecanismo automático que garante o balanceamento do sistema. 
Para melhor entender se o modelo sueco seria viável para o caso português, é 
desenvolvido neste trabalho final de mestrado um modelo de simulação em que Portugal 
aplicaria o modelo sueco no mesmo ano em que a Suécia o fez. Por último, são retiradas 
conclusões sobre o impacto financeiro e social que tal adoção teria. 
 
 
 
Palavras-chave: segurança social, pensão, benefício-definido, contribuição-
definida, contribuição nocional definida, repartição, financiamento por capitalização, 
riqueza nocional de pensão, mecanismo automático de balanceamento. 
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I. Introduction 
Since the beginning of the 21st century much has been discussed regarding the 
future sustainability of the Portuguese social security system, some argue it is sustainable 
(Rosa, 2013; da Silva et al., 2004), while others regard it as unsustainable (Bravo, 2013; 
Mendes, 2011). Many defendants of the unsustainability claim the majority of alleged 
problems would be solved with a change in paradigm: the introduction of a notional-
defined contribution scheme resembling the Swedish model. 
Hence, the first point to consider before the formulation of an opinion, is the 
reasoning for the existence of social security systems, where the vast majority of the 
authors state the main reason is poverty relief (Brown, 2008), either in the form of 
pensions for the elderly or even unemployment subsidies or similar. Moreover, some 
scholars (Spicker, 1993) disagree that poverty relief is the main reason, regarding all 
reasons as equally important. The principles of a social security system are underneath 
the tiers created, the vast majority of the authors (Barr & Diamond, 2009) proclaim a 
three tiers model while others (Holzmann, 2005) prefer a five tiers model claiming it deals 
better with multiple objectives and risks. 
The second point to consider is the possible schemes for the pension system: a 
defined-benefit (benefits are stablished in advanced) or a defined-contribution 
(contribution rate is stablished in advanced) scheme, and it can be financed in a Pay-As-
You-Go (current contributions are used to pay current benefits) or fully-funded (an 
individual´s contributions are used to pays their pension in future) basis. From these 
combinations the notional defined contribution scheme results from a defined-
contribution scheme financed in a PAYG logic. 
2 
2 
Ana Isabel B. Boleto The suitability of the Swedish pension system to the 
Portuguese case 
The last issue to completely understand if a pension system is sustainable is to 
comprehend the worldwide evolution of pension systems and its reasoning, especially for 
the past 35 years, where these can be divided into two major periods/changes of 
paradigms: from 1981 to 2004 and since 2004. According to Orenstein (2013) several 
reasons lie in the ‘privatization’ trend started in 1981: The Chilean change for a fully-
funded and defined-contribution scheme; demographic aging and budget deficits (Brooks, 
2009); and the transnational campaign first conducted by the Chile and later by the World 
Bank (citing Madrid, 2003; Orenstein, 2008). Concerning the period from 2004 onwards, 
the reasons for the second change were: failure of the Chilean and Argentinean model to 
achieve a better coverage rate and to be more efficient (Kritzer, 2008); the combination 
of the 2008 financial crisis and the fiscal rules some countries might face (Casey, 2014); 
the World Bank reprove of the campaign it had pursued (citing Kay & Sinha, 2008); and 
the Chilean admission of failure of the fully-funded defined-contribution model. 
Gathered all the necessary basic knowledge on pension systems, the aim of this 
master’s final work is to conclude whether the implementation of an NDC scheme 
resembling the Swedish model would be suitable for the Portuguese case. In this sense, a 
simulation model is performed, where Portugal would implement an NDC scheme like 
the Swedish model and this would be enforced from 1999 onwards, equal to the Swedish 
process. Therefore, the answer for the question lies in the comparison of the simulation 
results with historical levels. 
This work begins by presenting principles of a social security system, then briefly 
defines the possibilities of a pension system design and the recent worldwide context. The 
third chapter characterizes both the Swedish and the Portuguese schemes and displays 
some authors arguing on the systems sustainability. The fourth chapter exhibits the 
3 
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simulation model building, while the fifth contents some conclusions on the suitability of 
the Swedish model in Portugal. On chapter six the simulation model limitations and some 
future investigation ideas are presented. Finally, chapter seventh concludes. 
II. Literature Review 
It is of most importance to realize the guiding principles of a social security system 
to better understand why it functions in a certain manner. Moreover, it is equally 
important to comprehend the most used schemes and funding possibilities to recognize 
their consequences on current and future pensioners. This chapter presents a brief 
literature review on those matters. 
1. Guiding principles of a pension system 
Quoting Brown (2008), what should be the priorities in any well-designed social 
security pension system? 
It is widely accepted in the literature that poverty relief is a priority, either in the 
form of pensions for the elderly, unemployment subsidies to prevent people to face 
poverty, and benefits to people with low incomes. However, some authors claim this is 
the number one priority (Brown, 2008), while others (Spicker, 1993) claim this is as 
important as social protection, for example. 
Furthermore, Brown (2008) and Holzmann (2005) claim a social security system 
should provide a sufficient and acceptable living-standard in the post-retirement stage 
(consumption smoothing). An acceptable replacement ratio must therefore exist in each 
regional system either by the pension amount or, if necessary, with complementary funds. 
The solidarity goal (Brown, 2008) can be combined with progressive redistribution 
(Knox & Cornish, 1997) in an equitable national pension system, in the sense that income 
should be transferred from high income contributors to low income contributors (or from 
4 
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contributors to people who do not contribute) although, there should be a ceiling in the 
redistribution process in order not to disincentive (high) income contributors to 
participate in the social security system through non-compliance or by staying out the 
formal economy. Knox & Cornish (1997) argue an equitable national pension system 
should also consider horizontal equity, i.e. similar benefits should be provided to 
individuals in the same circumstances. Moreover, on equitable national pension systems, 
lifetime contributions ought to be related with benefits, ensuring those who contribute 
more to the system, also receive more. On this sense, the authors consider that a national 
pension system can only be perceived as fair by its citizens if they understand it. 
Therefore, the social security system must be clear and comprehensible, being 
transparency a crucial factor. 
Brown (2008) also considers other principles, such as: contributions/taxes should 
not be too high in order not to disincentive employers to hire new employees; the system 
ought not to create too large benefits that would discourage citizens to safe for retirement; 
the system should prevent incentives for contributors to leave the active life prematurely; 
and the system should not encourage unnecessary absences from the active life. 
Finally, there is a consensus among authors (Barr & Diamond, 2009; Knox & 
Cornish, 1997) that it is unrealistic to have a social security system that satisfies all 
requirements, although these must be considered. 
2. Framework 
a. Design of a pension system: tiers, schemes and funding 
Usually the stated principles are associated with the three tiers of a social security 
system - although there are other possible structures. The first tier is related to the 
principle of poverty relief (redistribution function), it is mandatory and generally publicly 
5 
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managed; the second tier is associated with the consumption smoothing principle, it is 
also usually mandatory and can be either publicly or privately managed; and the third tier 
is voluntary, related to savings, aiming to enlarge individual choice to save more for 
retirement, and has a funded basis (Barr & Diamond, 2009; Barr, 2002). 
However, the World Bank suggests a five tier model1 (Holzmann, 2005), arguing 
that experience proved that a multitier design deals better with multiple objectives and 
risks of pension systems. 
Concerning the possible schemes and their traditional conception, a social security 
system can be a defined benefit or defined contribution. The former ensures a benefit will 
be paid in retirement, based on a pre-established benefit equation, while a defined 
contribution plan establishes a fixed contribution rate throughout a worker’s active life 
and so, the retirement benefit is the result of the accumulated contributions and the 
provided investment return by financial markets 
In terms of funding, a social security system can be funded or unfunded. If on one 
hand in a funded system a worker’s contributions are used to pay their own benefits in 
the future (fully-funded scheme), on the other hand, in an unfunded plan a worker’s 
contributions are used to pay current pensioners benefits (Pay-As-You-Go).  
In the literature, some combinations of schemes and funding have a specific 
designation such as the financial defined contribution scheme  – a fully-funded defined 
contribution plan, in which the worker’s rate of return is given by the markets – and the 
                                                 
1 Zero tier – non-contributory basis financed by the state, related to the principle of poverty alleviation, 
aiming to provide a minimum level of protection; first tier – mandatory and liked with contributions linked 
to earnings and financed in a PAYG matter to address individuals’ myopia, uncertainty of life expectancy, 
risks of financial markets and others; second-tier – mandatory and a FDC scheme; third tier – voluntary 
and may assume various forms; DB or DB, individual savings for the retirement stage, disability, death and 
others; fourth tier – assumes the form of a non-financial tier, allowing individual to have access to informal 
support (such as family support), formal social programs (such as health care and housing) and other 
individual financial/non-financial assets (such as home ownership) (Holzmann, 2008). 
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notional defined contribution scheme  – which denotes a PAYG defined contribution 
plan, where the implied rate of return is given by features established by the State which 
are linked to the economy development (Holzmann & Palmer, 2005; Brooks, 2009). 
b. International evolution 
In this section it will be revised some changes and its reasoning in worldwide social 
security systems in the last 35 years. 
According to Orenstein’s (2013), the last 35 years can be divided into two major 
periods in worldwide pension systems history: from 1981 to 2004 and since 2004 until 
presently. Moreover, scholars present several reasons for these trending changes. 
In 1981, Chile changed its DB and PAYG scheme to a privately managed FDC 
system (Mesa-Lago, 2009). From that period until 2004, Orenstein (2013) states that more 
than 30 developing countries located in Latin-America, Central and Eastern Europe, Asia 
and Africa have also followed the same pattern in terms of social security financing. The 
author also argues that scholars have different explanations for the financing change to 
fully-funded schemes during 1981-2004: domestic economic factors, such as 
demographic aging and budget deficits (citing Brook, 2009); international factors, such 
as the spread and mimic within peer countries (citing Brooks, 2005; Weyland, 2005) and 
the influence of the transnational campaign started by Chile and later conducted by the 
World Bank (citing Madrid, 2003; Müller, 1999, 2003; Orenstein, 2008; World Bank, 
2006). 
Concerning domestic factors, Holzmann (2013) claims that the demographic aging 
factor was motivated by the argument that a fully-funded scheme would solve by itself 
the situation and the verified high rates of return during the period would continue in the 
7 
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future2. Regarding the budget deficits, Orenstein (2013) argues that the adoption of a 
fully-funded scheme was attractive to governments’ since it would force people to save 
for retirement in individual accounts and so states could reduce the guarantees level.  
Regarding the international factors and more specifically the spread and mimic 
within peer countries factor, Brooks (2005) expected the probability of private pension 
system’s adoption in a given country to increase as the proportion of peer countries 
implementing it rises. This actually materialized, concluding that there is a powerful 
interdependence logic in Latin-America, Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia, 
although there is no significant relation in OECD countries. 
However, Orenstein (2013) considers that the above factors did not play the major 
role, being this played by the World Bank in its 1990’s statement that privatizing pension 
systems would solve population aging problem – transnational campaign factor. 
One could argue the change back into the PAYG paradigm was due to the 2008 
financial crisis but Orenstein (2013) disagrees, mentioning the paradigm started to change 
by 2004/2005. In this regard, two explanations for this new change are pointed: fiscal and 
ideational explanations. Concerning fiscal explanations, Kritzer (2008) posits that in 
Chile and Argentina the fully-funded scheme failed to achieve a better coverage rate, and 
instead it decreased, as well as it registered an enormous proportion of administrative 
costs, which reduce drastically the retirement income. Moreover, Orenstein (2013) 
records the cost of changing from a PAYG to fully-funded scheme, which amounts to a 
few percentage points of GDP each year, as benefits are still paid by State but the amount 
of contributions received decreases significantly. Furthermore, Casey (2014) reminds that 
the combination of the financial crises of 2008 with the fiscal rules countries from the EU 
                                                 
2 Orenstein (2013) claims in the 1980’s returns on capital were higher than labour returns. 
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justifies the permanent/temporary abolishment of fully-funded schemes: in 2008 Hungary 
applied for a bailout to the IMF and in 2011 all second-tier contributors (fully-funded tier) 
were transferred again into the public pension scheme and the fund money was used to 
diminish government debt and finance current expenditure; Portugal3 and Ireland4, two 
other countries that required a bailout from troika, also nationalized private funded 
schemes as well as other countries. On the same logic, other nations followed a similar 
path, influencing private pension funds investment decision – such as the United 
Kingdom and Netherlands – or absorbed reserve funds before the stablished moment – 
such as France, Spain and Poland. However, the EU case was not unique as it occurred 
in other locations in the world with, e.g., the abolishment of the private system and 
integration in the public system in Argentina in 2008 (Mesa-Lago, 2009). 
Regarding ideational explanations, Orenstein (2013) concludes that these present 
the most feasible reasons for the new private systems abrupt stop in 2005 throughout the 
world. The first ideational explanation presented by the author (citing Kay & Sinha, 2008) 
is the fact that, in 2006, an internal evaluation report of the World Bank reproved the 
campaign it had pursued in supporting the creation of private pension systems in countries 
which did not fulfilled the necessary preconditions and failed to accomplish issues of 
coverage and adequacy of pension systems. The author mentions this marked the 
cessation of new private pension systems. The other explanation given by the author 
highlights the Chilean recognition that the fully-funded scheme failed some key 
objectives (mentioned above) and thus, Chile transmitted a strong signal to the world that 
the implemented model was unsustainable and a revision was required. 
                                                 
3 The national telecom and banks pension funds, which amount, respectively, 1.5% and 3.5% of the GDP. 
4 Universities and other public agencies pension funds. 
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In sum, ideational factors by mid-2000 combined with the global financial crises of 
2008 changed individuals’ attitude regarding the viability of financial markets in 
comparison to public provision of pensions. 
III. The Portuguese and Swedish social security systems 
It is of most importance to understand social security systems in terms of their 
functions and characteristics before the creation of any empirical model or evaluation. In 
this context, this chapter will present a brief characterization of the perished Swedish 
model that existed till 1999, the current Portuguese and Swedish systems and, finally, 
some critic analysis regarding social and economic sustainability of the Swedish model. 
1. The Swedish public pension system 
a. Brief characterization 
Cheng (2010), Palme (2005) and Scherman (1999) provide a brief overview of the 
Swedish social security system prior to the existing model. Established in 1913 as the first 
national scheme in the world5, it was characterized as a mandatory DB model financed in 
a PAYG logic. Moreover, it was composed by two parts: a flat-rate basic pension and an 
earnings related supplementary pension6. Hence, to be entitled to the former, an individual 
must have lived in Sweden for, at least, 40 years or worked for, at least, 30 years and, to 
be eligible to the supplementary pension, a career of, at least, 30 years is required (to 
receive a full earnings-related benefit, an individual must also had 65 years old (Palmer, 
2000)). Furthermore, for those who received no or a very small supplementary pension, 
some additional cash and housing supplements was provided. Concerning the scheme’s 
financial arrangement, the minimum protection was financed through employer’s 
                                                 
5 In 1913 it covered groups such as civil servants and military officers. 
6 Up to 7.5 base amounts. 
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contributions and the State budget and the earnings related pension was financed in a 
PAYG logic. 
Moreover, the annual benefit was calculated as 60% of the average income during 
the highest 15 years in a 30 years’ career diminished by one base amount (this corresponds 
to the pension base, which is indexed to prices) (Anderson, 2005). 
Regarding the earnings ceiling design, this was price-indexed and so, with 
continuous growth in real wages, most people would be above the ceiling and, as a 
consequence, the increase in earnings would not correspond to an increase in benefit. 
Concerning the motivations for the paradigm change, Scherman (1999) adds the 
problem of earnings ceiling design to the usual two pointed problems7. On the other hand, 
Cheng (2010) underlines the macroeconomic environment, stating the financial 
weakening on national indicators from the 1970’s onwards: the average growth rate from 
1960-1965 was 57%, being 1.2% between 1990-1995 (citing Ding Bing, 1996); social 
security expenditures in 1965 represented 7% of the GDP, which grew to 50.1% between 
1991-1995 (citing Zhou Hong, 2006); government’s financial deficit grew 212.8 times in 
just 31 years (1950-1981); and the transfer expenditures, in percentage of public debt, 
increased from 42.8 percentage points to 48.5% between 1974 and 1981 (citing Ding 
Bing, 1996). 
The old-age pension system’s revision resulted in a mixed model, with features 
never observed. According to Scherman (1999) the new model was also a compulsory 
national scheme that was fully enforced on January 1st, 1999. Characterized as an NDC 
scheme, it has as core ideas an unchanged contribution rate in the indefinite future and 
                                                 
7 The usual two pointed problems are: the PAYG linkage dependency between financial performance and 
economic growth; and the effect of demographic fluctuations, more specifically, the retirement of baby-
boomers’ generation. 
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the system’s financial sustainability throughout time. Moreover, it is composed by two 
subsystems: the minimum guaranteed and the earnings-related part. 
Concerning the minimum guaranteed subsystem, it aims to provide a certain 
amount to all individuals aged over 65 who have no/low earnings-related pension, 
entering into effect for new pension on 2003 (Scherman, 2011; Anderson, 2005). 
Moreover, to be entitled to a full guaranteed pension one must have lived for, at least 40 
years8 in Sweden, otherwise it will be reduced by 1/40 for each year less than the required 
40 years (Swedish Pension Agency9). Likewise, individuals in these conditions are also 
eligible to a housing supplement. Furthermore, it is financed by the general revenue in 
the sense that the State pays the difference between the guaranteed level and the earnings-
related pension an individual is entitled. Additionally, it is means-tested, indexed to the 
cost-of-living and an individual can obtain some supplements through income-test 
measures (Könberg et al., 2006). 
Regarding the earnings-related subsystem, its full effect will only materialize in 
2044, until then a transitional period between the two systems occurs (Scherman, 2011). 
This subsystem can be divided in two parts: the PAYG and the individual account, which 
together sum a total contribution rate of 18.5% - equally delivered by employer and 
employee (Cheng, 2010; Palmer, 2000). 
With regard to the PAYG part, Settergren (2001) notes that all working individuals 
must contribute with 16% to their notional account and this amount is transferred to the 
system’s buffer fund. Moreover, it is from the latter that all pension in payment are paid 
and pension rights are registered. Additionally, pension rights and pensions in payment 
are indexed, respectively, to the average wage growth (income index) and average wage 
                                                 
8 The required 40 years must have occurred between the ages of 16 and 64 years old. 
9 Website visited on June, 16th 2016 at 3 p.m.: https://www.pensionsmyndigheten.se/Welcome_en 
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growth discounted by 1.6% each year (Scherman, 2003). Furthermore, a full working-
career is considered and there is no statutory pension age - each individual can choose 
from the age of 61 when they shall retire either partially (25%, 50% or 75% of a full 
annuity) or fully. Consequently, if one opts to retire partially, it is possible to combine 
earnings from work with the benefit - contributions will be considered on the benefit 
recalculation upon full retirement10 (Palmer, 2000; Settergren, 2001; Anderson, 2005). 
Concerning the individual account (Premium Reserve system), it represents the 
remaining 2.5% of the full mandatory contribution rate and can be privately or publicly 
managed11 (Scherman, 2007). In this, each contributor must choose the funds they want 
to invest considering more than 700 possible investments – up to the maximum of five 
funds. Moreover, there is no guarantee against bankruptcies neither a minimum rate of 
return, being all the risk supported by individuals (Scherman 2007; Hapt & Kluth, 2013). 
Given the previous information, each individual entitled to an earnings-related part 
will receive, whenever desired from the age of 61, the income from their notional and 
individual accounts12. Besides this, the ‘safety net’ from situations such as unemployment 
and early retirement end at the age of 65 years old (Scherman, 2011). 
Parallel to the existence of a minimum pension, a ceiling on the earnings-related 
pension also reside in this system, with a ceiling level of about 50% above the average 
wage, it is indexed to the annual average wage growth (Palmer, 2000). 
                                                 
10 Recalculation can occur any number of times. 
11 Although, the administration and insurance function of this sub-system are under the responsibility of the 
Premium Pension Authority, which, by stated law, should follow the same applicable rules as private 
insurance companies. 
12 The accounts can be ‘called’ at different moments, for example, an individual retiring at the age of 65 
can choose to receive its earnings-related pension and delaying the receipt of its premium pension as a 
result of a low market performance. 
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Scherman (2006) states that the PAYG scheme contains two features intended to 
ensure the system’s financial sustainability: the buffer fund and the automatic balancing 
mechanism. Regarding the buffer fund, at the outset of the new system, the accumulated 
funds under the old system were transferred to the buffer fund to serve as initial capital 
(Scherman, 2007). Moreover, and as previously mentioned, it is where both contributions 
paid and pensions in payment are registered. Consequently, the buffer fund accumulates 
capital in some periods and this is used to counter financial distresses in other moments. 
Considering the ABM, it is activated whenever the balance ratio (coefficient between the 
buffer fund assets and liabilities) is lower than one. Its activation implies a different 
indexation of pensions and notional pensions’ capital: the balance index, which results 
from the multiplication of the income index and the balance ratio. Given this, whenever 
the balance ratio is lower than one, pensions and notional accounts will grow slower than 
the average income and, if in the next period the balance ratio in higher than one, pensions 
and notional accounts will still be indexed to the balance index, being therefore indexed 
at a higher rate than the average income growth. This process will occur until the moment 
the balance index equals the income index value (Settergren, 2001). 
Finally, the balance ratio is also affected by other risk factors such as life 
expectancy and birth rate, given that as whenever the former increases and the latter 
decreases, the balance ratio is lower than one and the ABM is activated (Scherman, 2007; 
Settergren, 2001). In this sense, the system was designed to provide individuals with an 
annual statement of five pages regarding the forecast of their earnings-related and 
minimum guaranteed pension in face of different possible scenarios: The Orange 
Envelope (Anderson, 2005; Regúlez-Castillo & Vidal-Meliá, 2011). 
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b. Sustainability evaluations 
The analysis about the sustainability of the Swedish pension system is often 
involved in discussion, some affirm it is sustainable while others argue it is not. The 
answer for such disagreement is, partially, related to the kind of sustainability in matter: 
financial sustainability or social sustainability. 
In this topic, Scherman (2011) arises as one of the main criticizers of the Swedish 
pension system. Firstly, the replacement rate is not adequate, as it does not fulfil the target 
interval established in the framework legislation of 1994 for a person who works to a 
normal extent – the target range is between 55% and 65% and the number of years of a 
normal extent was never defined although, from the wording of the bill, 40 years’ work 
is what is expected (Scherman, 2006). Such conclusions are made based on the 2005 
National Strategy Report on Pensions, where an individual with constant average earnings 
for 40 years retiring in 2005 would have a replacement rate of 53% and, an individual in 
the same conditions retiring on 2050 would have a replacement rate of 40.4%. Moreover, 
in order for a person born in 1985 to obtain a replacement rate that neutralizes the increase 
effect in life-expectancy, they must work until the age of 67 years and one month13, 
obtaining a replacement rate of 46%. However, if an individual wishes to pursue the 53% 
replacement rate that a person born in 1940 obtains, a retirement age of 69 years old 
would be necessary. In sum, 40 years of earnings at a contribution rate of 18.5% are not 
enough to produce the target replacement rate, 42 years or more are necessary. Moreover, 
the author records the difficulty of having a career with no interruptions and the struggle 
for old-age people to be employed to contrast with a required working career of 42 years 
                                                 
13 An increase that represents an additional 25 months of work when compared to the 65 years old age 
retirement for people born in 1940 – these 25 months must represent a remuneration that is compatible with 
the average earnings before the 65th birthday. 
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or more (Scherman, 2007). In this regard, the average pension for the birth years’ cohort 
of 1985/1990 is 17 p.p. less than for those born in 1940 although, from the 17 p.p., only 
7 p.p. are related with the development of demography between the years of 2005 and 
2050. 
Secondly, although the favorable economic and wages development in the decade 
prior to 2007, retired people did not receive an increase in pensions in accordance to 
development and so, income disparities grew (Scherman, 2006, 2007). Furthermore, the 
adequacy of pensions is dependent on more than the system, the welfare arrangements 
provided for citizens should be observed. However, these and the ability to finance them 
is uncertain – representatives of regional and local governments argue about the 
unsustainability of the system (Scherman, 2007). Additionally, some problems of social 
justice are emphasized: indexation of the minimum pension to inflation, in comparison to 
the indexation to average wage growth in the earnings related part, implying that 
whenever the average wage increase more than inflation, the guaranteed pension 
decreases in comparison. Although the Swedish government finds appropriate such 
‘marginalization’, this is contrary to most public pension systems and organizations 
throughout the world (e.g. OECD) that consider this a basic objective (Scherman, 2003). 
Moreover, access to the general welfare system and social insurance should be allowed 
to everyone. However, the Swedish ‘safety net’ terminates at the age of 65, which not 
only violates the latter principle as it is also incompatible with a society where individuals 
are required to work longer (Scherman, 2007). 
Moreover, in the 1994 framework legislation was established that in the Premium 
Pension system a minimum guaranteed rate of return should be included and security 
should be above the diversity in management funds. Situation that did not occurred, as 
16 
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currently there is no minimum guaranteed rate of return and more than 700 funds are 
available (Scherman, 2003). Furthermore, such sub-system incurs in high transaction 
costs as people are allowed to change fund whenever they desire - the Swedish Pension 
Agency states that, if no measures are carried-out, a 22% of total contributions of an 
individual joining at the age of 20 years, may have to be used to cover administrative 
costs if no measures are taken (Scherman, 2007). 
Likewise, the reason for the ultimate reduction of pensions lies in the ABM as 
individuals bear all risks of financial imbalances in the earnings related part. Therefore, 
it does not fulfil the requirement of a balance between financial constraints and social 
objectives. (Scherman, 2007). Hence, this mechanism was only created due the 
perception that the system assumptions were overoptimistic - the buffer fund reserves 
were not sufficient to both cover pension liabilities and compensate the national treasury 
for the costs incurred in the system transition. Consequently, it does not create any space 
to monitor the generational contract neither the possibility to change the system in face 
of external shocks by achieving a fair balance between social objectives and financial 
constraints: whenever a disturbance occurs, current and future pensions are automatically 
reduced (Scherman, 2003). Recognizing this, Barr and Diamond (2011) sustain that in 
face of the ABM activation, a retiree is never able to recover the losses and catch-up the 
active population’s pace of income14. Furthermore, in 1999 the ABM was presented as 
an extreme measure that would be activated only in extreme circumstances in order to 
ensure the system financial sustainability (Scherman, 2006; Könberg et al., 2006). 
However, it has been activated more frequently: in July 2011 the Pension Authority 
forecasted the decrease of the average monthly public pension of SEK 12 000 in 2009 to 
                                                 
14 For detailed information on this subject, please see Barr and Diamond (2011). 
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SEK 11 300 in 2011, being the value registered in 2009 recovered only by 2014. On the 
other hand, salaries were estimated to increase from SEK 12 000 to 14 000 between 2009 
and 2014. This mechanism was expected to affect pensions until 2020. Moreover, in the 
beginning of the 2008 crises15 it was projected that if no measures were to be done, the 
ABM would diminish pensions by 4% in 2010 (Scherman, 2012). 
Furthermore, the inexistence of a statutory pension age leads to lack of transparency 
and system’s comprehension given that it is very hard for individuals to compile all 
information regarding the evolution of demography, economy and wages – which are 
uncertain – and conclude which is the best age to retire. (Scherman, 2007). 
Finally, Barr (2006) says that a NDC scheme fails to allow efficient decision in 
consumption smoothing but later (Góra and Palmer, 2003) mentions that such system is 
efficient in the sense it does not aim to achieve a redistributive function among groups, 
rather it aims to fulfil a redistributive function within an individual’s lifecycle. 
In sum, Scherman (2003, 2011) considers that the current Swedish system is 
financially but not socially sustainable and it should not be followed by other countries. 
Moreover, by 2011, Sherman and Barr and Diamond stated the model is under revision 
due to the consequences of the 2008 crises on pensions. Also Chłoń-Domińczak et al. 
(2012) point out that in response to the crises, the ABM’s valuation principle changed to 
a three-years moving average16. 
Valdés-Prieto (2000) concludes a notional account system with automated 
mechanisms is not financially sustainable in the short-run17 in the real world as: 1) the 
                                                 
15 The ABM was activated due the reduction of the buffer fund value by almost 30% (Kruse, 2010). 
16 The authors refer the Swedish Social Insurance Agency (2009) to indicate that the balance index in 2008 
and 2009 was, respectively, 09672 and 0957 and, due to the change in principle valuation, this index was 
revised upwards, to 0.9826 in 2008 and 0.957 in 2009, diminishing the consequent reduction in pensions. 
17 Short-run financial stability is defined by the author as any measure that avoids reducing assets and 
issuing debt; they also define short-run as a period of one to two calendar years; they regard the long-term 
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hypothetical case of the number of contributors and contribution rate should remain 
constant over time; 2) the credited notional interest rate is the growth rate of contribution 
revenue18 and; 3) (i) the notional interest rate is the growth rate of contribution revenue; 
(ii) pensions are indexed to the growth rate of contribution revenue; (iii) pensioner 
balances are credited ex post the same notional interest rate as contemporaneous 
contributors; and (iv) the authorities do not interfere with mortality projections to achieve 
financial balance19 . Therefore, such system should have other financial adjustments 
mechanisms superimposed (e.g. government guarantees and repeated legislation). 
The findings of Ishizaki et al. (2011), Lu et al. (2008) and Auerbach & Lee (2009) 
are consistent with the previous results. The former concluded that the adoption of a 
scheme like the Swedish model in Japan would not be financially sustainable in the short-
run20, as the automatic mechanism would be activated and the balance ratio would only 
be 1 approximately 29 years later. However, they consider the scheme is financially viable 
and would increase overall replacement rates in Japan in the long-run if some 
complementary policies are carried out, such as a reserve fund. Similarly, Auerbach & 
Lee (2009) also noticed the financial instability that is produced from a model identical 
to the Swedish, claiming that the internal rate of return is more vulnerable to variations 
in demography and economy than it is believed. 
Moreover, Chłoń-Domińczak et al. (2012) design a simulation model to examine if 
the Swedish social security system (as well as the Italian) would financially endure in 
face of the following scenario: permanent decline in labor productivity and size of the 
                                                 
period as irrelevant for the study as the system situation in that period is always influenced by the political 
process. 
18 Except for the steady-state growth case. 
19 Except for the steady-state growth case. 
20 However, the concept of short-run here is rather different than in Valdés-Prieto (2000), it is considered 
12 years. 
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youngest cohort and an increase in longevity at retirement. The study’s conclusion 
indicated the system would be able to surpass the difficulties, albeit with moments with 
small shortfalls. 
Furthermore, Boeri & Galasso (2012) focus on the consequences a dual labor 
market21 implies on future pensioners’ benefit. Emphasis is given to the importance of 
early contributions combined with the compounded effect on the pension calculation, 
where it can be concluded the most affected workers are the temporary works, who 
usually display discontinuous careers and consequently fail to accumulate contributions 
in the early stage of their working careers and therefore, do not benefit from the 
compounding effect – needing to postpone retirement. 
Contrary to Scherman, Palmer is a major defendant of the introduction of an NDC 
scheme resembling the Swedish model. Palmer (2002) presents some advantages of 
introducing an NDC scheme in EU countries: breakage of the standardized life course 
model, by allowing people to choose when to retire; and separate the income sources from 
which the old-age pension and other benefits are paid to create transparency and eliminate 
some externalities - e.g. attempts to transfer costs from current to future generations. 
To conclude, a consensus on the merits and on the sustainability of the Swedish 
social security model is far from being reached. Some authors focus on the financial 
sustainability of the system while others give more emphasis on the social aspect. 
2. The Portuguese social security system 
a. Brief characterization 
The welfare-state in Portugal was born with the Revolution of 1974 with two 
fundamental pillars: the national health system and the social security system. 
                                                 
21 A dual labor market consists in a separate labor market contracts for temporary and permanent workers 
and permanent. 
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The social security aim is to promote better and sustained conditions and levels of 
social protection, increase in reinforcement of equity and promotion of the system and its 
management. Moreover, until 1993 workers of public and private sectors were covered 
by different systems of protection and so, their contribution rate was different: the public 
sector was covered by CGA and the private sector was covered by social security. 
However, since 1993, workers from both sectors are obliged to enroll in the social security 
system, assuming an equal rate of contribution (Gouveia & Sarmento, 2002). 
Similarly to other EU countries, social security is composed by a contributory and 
a non-contributory part. Moreover, it is currently composed by three sub-systems: 
citizens’ social welfare allowances; complementary; and insurance-based system22: social 
welfare allowances represents the non-contributory part of the system, which aims to 
guarantee basic rights, equality of opportunities, promote well-being and social cohesion 
to all citizens (article n.º 26, Law n.º 4/2007) and is financed mainly through State Budget 
transferences (Guedes & Pereira, 2013); the complementary sub-system is an individual 
and voluntary regime, managed by the State or a private entity, that intents to provide 
complementary benefits to the insured-based sub-system (articles n. º 81, n. º 82, n. º 83 
and n. º 85, Law n. º 4/2007); the insurance-based sub-system’s objective is to compensate 
the reduction/loss of occupational earnings in case of sickness, maternity, paternity, 
adoption, unemployment, death, disability, work accidents and occupational sickness and 
old age (article n. º 52, Law n. º 4/2007). Consequently, only employees and self-
employed are legally entitled to participate in this sub-system. Generally, the contribution 
rate is 34.75% of remunerations - 11% delivered by the employees and 23.75% by 
employers. 
                                                 
22 Sistema previdencial, sistema de proteção social e cidadania e sistema complementar in Law nº4/2007. 
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Furthermore, current contributions to the system are used to finance current 
benefits. Therefore, it is characterized as a PAYG scheme. However, whenever a surplus 
occurs it is capitalized through financial markets and managed by the social security trust 
fund23, working as a saving account in the event of deficit in the insurance-based sub-
system (Guedes & Pereira, 2013). 
In order to obtain the full old-age benefit, one must have contributed for 40 years24 
and fulfil the minimum age requirement. The latter is revised each year and is directly 
related to the average life-expectancy so, whenever it increases in a certain year, also 
increases the minimum age to be entitled to the full benefit25 - the minimum age was 66 
years and 2 months in 2015. Moreover, one can require the benefit before the normal age, 
although with a penalty that is also related to the average life-expectancy, the so-called 
sustainability factor26 - according to the social security website it is 0.8698 for 2015. 
Hence, the benefit formula is the following: Benefit = Reference remuneration * Global 
formation tax * Sustainability factor27. Through this, one can register the major impact 
the sustainability factor has on the benefit. 
Finally, and as seen previously, the benefit consists in a weighted calculation of all 
remunerations throughout a life-time career. Consequently, the Portuguese social security 
system is characterized as a defined benefit regime. 
                                                 
23 Instituto de Gestão de Fundos de Capitalização da Segurança Social. 
24 Established from 2002 onwards by Decree Law n. º 35/02. Until this moment it was considered the best 
10 from the last 15 years (Mendes, 2011). 
25 The equation to determinate the normal age to access the old-age benefit is:𝑚𝑛 = ∑ (𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖−2 −
𝑛
𝑖=2015
𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖−3) ∗ 12 ∗
2
3
, where m is the increase in the number of months to the normal age of benefit attribution 
in 2014 (66 years); n represents the years at which the benefit begins; and ALE is the average life-
expectancy at the age of 65; this equation results from the revision that occurred in 2013. 
26 Sustainability factor = Average life-expectancy at age 65 in year 2000/Average life-expectancy at age 65 
in the previous year to benefit payment. 
27 Reference remuneration = Total of yearly remunerations revaluated of all contributive period/ (number 
of civil years with record of remunerations up to the limit of 40 years * 14); Global formation tax is the 
number of civil years with relevant remunerations to record multiplied by the accrual rate (Indexante dos 
apoios sociais) – see appendix 1, table 1. 
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b. Sustainability evaluations 
Many public individualities have discussed the sustainability of the Portuguese 
social security system, either claiming it is unsustainable and the Swedish scheme should 
be followed, or stating it is sustainable. However, most of these do not publish supportive 
documentation to their arguments. In this sense, this topic is shorter and centered in just 
a few authors. 
Firstly, Mendes (2011) records the 1998’s conclusion of the Social Security White 
Book28 was that, in one hand the current balance of social security was sustainable whilst, 
on the other hand, in the long-term financial situation would deteriorate immensely as a 
consequence of the regime maturity and demographic evolution29. As a consequence, in 
2002 some changes were implemented, such as considering the entire contributory career 
(40 years) in the benefit calculation. However, in the same year the European Commission 
forecasted a 10 percentage points’30 increase in expenditures with pensions for Portugal 
between 2005 and 2050, conducting it for the group of countries classified as highly risky 
in terms of their public finances sustainability. In face of this, in 2007 the government 
implemented parametrical reforms: introduction of the sustainability factor in the benefit 
calculation; modular indexation of pensions to CPI, according to pensions’ level and GDP 
growth31; and indexation of the minimum pensions to the social support index. These 
measures conducted to a re-evaluation of the country’s long-term public finances 
sustainability to the group with medium risk. In author’s opinion, there is the need to 
instore a structural reform in the system given the current contribution burden, the context 
                                                 
28 Livro Branco da Segurança Social. 
29 The proportion of active population compared to people in retirement age would be progressively more 
unfavourable. 
30 To 21% of the GDP. 
31 Above a 2% GDP growth rate medium and high benefits are revised above CPI at -0.5 or 0.75 percentage 
points. 
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of economic crises and growing unemployment and the downward results of the political 
incentive to saving-for-retirement plan. 
Secondly, Bravo (2013) is also a defendant of a structural reform’s adoption. In this 
sense, two studies were performed: simulation of the long-run (2011-2060) sustainability 
of the Portuguese social security system; and the necessary changes in the system. Some 
conclusions of the first study reveal that the active population would decrease by 19.2%; 
the total dependency ratio would increase from 62.6% in 2011 to 93.9% in 2060; the 
support ratio32 would decrease drastically from 1.17 in 2011 to 0.84 in 2053; the system’s 
reserve fund would be exhausted in 2015; and the system’s balance runs a deficit 
throughout the studied period. Concerning the second study, a four tiers NDC system is 
proposed – the virtual indexation to the real growth rate of contributions and GDP. 
Thirdly, da Silva et al. (2004) conclude that social security can continue to play a 
major role in Portuguese citizens’ life if a balance is considered between principals of 
social security system, economic and demographic legislation and updated legislation. 
The paper studies social security’s actuarial and financial equilibrium both in the short-
term (10 years) and in the long-term (50 years). The authors conclude there is a long-term 
actuarial imbalance in the previdential contributory subsystem, where from 2025 onwards 
benefits payment will exceed contributions and, by 2050 the imbalance will amount to 
2.25% of GDP. In order to overcome the situation, a permanent reduction of 0.7% in 
growth-rate benefits expenditure, or an increase of 10% in the effective contribution rate 
on incomes is suggested by the authors since this is much lower than 34.75%.  
Concerning Rosa (2013, 2015) and the social approach, the author notices that the 
expenditures with social protection in Portugal are lower than in the EU33 to state that 
                                                 
32 Number of contributors per pensioner. 
33 Either in percentage of GDP or in euros per inhabitant. 
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there is no real correspondence to the claim that the expenditures with social protection 
in Portugal are higher than the EU average. Moreover, according to INE, if there were no 
social transferences (including pensions) in 2011, 42.5% of the population would be at a 
risk-of-poverty, while with it the proportion is enormously lower, 18%. This difference 
is related to the existence of pensions - which reduce the percentage of people at-risk-of-
poverty to 25.4% - and social subsidies - that diminishes this rate to 18%. The author 
mentions this opposes the IMF’s report that the Portuguese pension system aggravates 
social inequalities and does not diminishes poverty.  
Likewise, the author exemplifies through ‘The Navigator Company’ the impact in 
pensions that a transition from a DB to a DC scheme would imply: workers were promised 
a benefit complement that could attain 30% of income in the retirement moment at the 
end of 25 years of work. In this sense, employees hired an insurance company to evaluate 
if the change would be beneficial and concluded that only 0.5 to 2/3 of the complement 
would be received. 
On the financial side of the system, the attributed difficulties are the result of the 
recessive policy imposed by the Government and Troika, as it has been presenting high 
positive balances34 and the report from the Commission of the Social Security White 
Book concludes that until 1996, the non-contributed benefits were paid improperly with 
contributions from employees, when it should have been paid through State Budget 
(Louçã et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, considering Rosa (2013) the system’s financial sustainability is 
largely affected by economic growth in two perspectives: receipts (economic growth 
generates more employment alongside with an increase in the number of contributors), 
                                                 
34 Until 2012, 10 676 million euros were accumulated in the Social Security Trust Fund. 
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and expenditures (a decrease in unemployment would lead to a reduction in the number 
of unemployment and social subsidies). The author exemplifies the positive effect that an 
economic growth policy has on growing employment: the loss of revenues due to 
unemployment was between 23 561 million and 28 489 million euros between 
2000/2012. Moreover, the European Commission 2012’s report concludes that if the 
established objectives concerning employment or the performance of the best performing 
countries were attained, the effects of population aging on pensions’ expenditures 
proportion on GDP would be almost eliminated. In parallel, the 2015’s Ageing Report of 
the European Commission states that the cost with the Portuguese social security system 
will decrease from 13.8% in 2013 to 13.1% of GDP in 2060. Consequently, in the author’s 
opinion, as future costs with social security will be lower than the current values, the 
system is perfectly sustainable. Moreover, the report’s assumptions do not accommodate 
parametrical reforms that have already been implemented, such as the increasing 
retirement age. Consequently, if those had been considered, future costs with social 
security would be even lower. Finally, the author concludes that the system’s 
sustainability could be reinforced even in periods of crisis through a set of measures: 
effective combat against non-compliance and contributory fraud, effective recovery of 
debts to social security, changes of the system base of companies’ contributions calculus 
from income to net value added and the diversification of social security financing 
source35. 
3. The Swedish model as a role model to the Portuguese case 
The concept of an NDC was born in the beginning of the 1990’s and aroused as the 
resolution for the impasse between the traditional DB schemes and prefunded financial 
                                                 
35 For more information please see Rosa (2013) from page 132 to 139. 
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accounts (Holzmann & Palmer, 2012). In this sense, the World Bank is already 
performing studies to understand the implications such system had on those countries 
(Holzmann et al., 2012a; Holzmann et al., 2012b; Holzmann & Palmer, 2006). 
The following chapter develops a simulation assuming Portugal adopted an NDC 
system similar to the Swedish model in 1999, the same date it was adopted in Sweden. 
IV. The suitability of the Swedish social security system reform to the 
Portuguese case 
The simulation replicates the new Swedish social security functioning for Portugal, 
both in the case of the balance ratio’s change in valuation to a 3-years moving average 
and an annual balance ratio consideration. In addition, to take some conclusion 
concerning the adequacy of the models to the Portuguese case, the simulation results are 
compared to the historical data of the social security system from 1999 until 2014 and 
outlined considering the social and economic differences of Portugal and Sweden. 
1. Hypothesis 
The following model is inspired in the numerical explanation of the Swedish 
pension system provided by Auerbach & Lee (2009) and the Orange Report (2014).  
The simulation concerning the adoption, in 1999, of the Swedish NDC model in 
Portugal, considers two versions: the first, assumes the average income with a balance 
ratio that is the average of the last 3-years from 2008 onwards (model 1); and, the second, 
with an annual balance ratio consideration throughout the period (model 2). However, to 
apply the simulation model, due to unavailable data, a set of hypothesis was formulated: 
a) for individuals born from 1938 and onwards, there is a full transition to the new 
scheme, while all others continue their careers covered by the old system; b) due to data 
constraints regarding the number of individuals with a given age, the employed people 
27 
27 
Ana Isabel B. Boleto The suitability of the Swedish pension system to the 
Portuguese case 
instead of the active beneficiaries is used; c) the distribution of the employed people and 
old-age pensioners within a cohort is linear; d) the new system’s pensioners are obtained 
as  the difference in each two consecutive years of the total pensioners ; e) mortality table 
is considered constant along the periods: mortality table for the 2013-2015 years provided 
by INE36; f) the maximum life age is 100 years old; g) the age at which an individual has 
their first job is at 15 years old, in order to increase the accuracy with reality; h) the 
contribution rate to the earnings related pension system is 16%; i) pensions in payment 
under the old system are actualized at the inflation rate, although, if this is negative, no 
actualization is formulated; j) people with 71 years old or more in 1999 are considered to 
have retired at the age of 65 years old; k) people from 15 to 25 years old in 1999 are not 
considered covered by the old system to better accommodate the several changes 
throughout time in the minimum period of time to be entitled to a pension and to perform 
the calculation of ‘the best 10 years from the last 15’ to obtain the reference remuneration; 
l) to calculate the reference remuneration in the old system, it is used the not revalorized 
income in accordance with Portaria n.º 54/94 until the year of 1982, as well as the 
revalorization coefficients from Portaria n.º 464/2006 until the year of 199837; m) the 
reserve fund is assumed to be capitalized at the effective annual real rate of return 
registered between 1999 and 2014 and available from the reports of IGFCSS. 
2. The generic model 
The following characteristics are the basis of the Portuguese NDC scheme:  
1. An individual account (NPW), which increases with the yearly contributions (T) 
and the rate of return (growth of the average wage - r) of the previous period.  
                                                 
36 To simplify calculations, it was used the mortality table of 2013-2015as it is the most recent one. 
37 These limit of years are due the unavailable data on the average wage prior 1982. 
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2. Some other factors influence the NPW, such as the probability of survival until 
next year for a given age, and the balance number (b) of two periods ago (from the 2008 
onwards, it is considered the average of the previous three periods in model 1). In this 
sense, whenever the balance number is higher than 1, no NPW accommodations are 
required although, if the balance number registers a value lower than 1, the NPW’s 
indexation will be transferred to the balance index (bindex), which combines the 
multiplication of the growth rate of the average wage and the balance ratio. The effects 
of these characteristics on NPW can be observed in the following set of equations: 
(1) 𝑁𝑃𝑊𝑡+1 = {
[𝑁𝑃𝑊𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑖) + 𝑇𝑡] ∗ 𝑝𝑡+1,𝑡+2
𝑖 ∗ 1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑡−2 > 1
[𝑁𝑃𝑊𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑖) + 𝑇𝑡] ∗ 𝑝𝑡+1,𝑡+2
𝑖 ∗ 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡−2, 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑡−2 < 1
 
However, the NPW of people aged between 55 and 70 also considers the 
transference of NPW from people that decide to retire (P), as well as the death of other 
individuals within these ages: 
(2) 𝑁𝑃𝑊𝑡+1 =
{
([𝑁𝑃𝑊𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑠) + 𝑇𝑡] ∗ 𝑝𝑡+1,𝑡+2
𝑠 − 𝑃𝑡+1
𝑠 − 𝑃𝑡+1
𝑠 ∗ (1 − 𝑝𝑡+1,𝑡+2
𝑠 )) ∗ 1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑡−2 > 1
([𝑁𝑃𝑊𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑠) + 𝑇𝑡] ∗ 𝑝𝑡+1,𝑡+2
𝑠 − 𝑃𝑡+1
𝑠 − 𝑃𝑡+1
𝑠 ∗ (1 − 𝑝𝑡+1,𝑡+2
𝑠 )) ∗ 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡−2, 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑡−2 < 1
 
3. The system’s total NPW is, therefore, the aggregate notional pension wealth of 
individuals not yet retired. 
4. The NPW is a virtual balance and, whenever individuals retire, their pensions 
will be an annuity based on the NPW at the retirement moment, where the economic 
annuity divisor is 1.6%. 
5. In parallel to the indexation of the NPW is the indexation of pensions in payment, 
which are indexed to the growth rate of the average wage discounted at 1.6% as long as 
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the balance ratio is higher than 1 and, in the opposite situation, are indexed to the balance 
index: 
(3)  𝑃𝑡+1 = {
𝑃𝑡(1+𝑟𝑡
𝑠)
1+0,016
∗ 1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑡−2 > 1
𝑃𝑡(1+𝑟𝑡
𝑠)
1+0,016
∗ 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡−2, 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑡−2 < 1
 
6. The system’s total cost with pensions is the addition of the multiplication of every 
pension for a given age and the number of annual old-age pensioners in the NDC system. 
7. The process of indexation transference from the income index to the balance 
index is called the Automatic Balancing Mechanism activation. 
8. Given the balance ratio importance in the amount of pensions in payment and 
NPW, a review of the balance ratio components is required. As previously mentioned, the 
balance ratio (b) represents the coefficient of the system’s assets - the system’s financial 
assets (assuming the reserve fund of the IGFCSS38  in 1999: F) and the yearly total 
contributions (C)) – and liabilities (the aggregated notional pension wealth (NPW) and 
pensions in payment (P)): 
(4)  𝑏𝑡 =
𝐹𝑡+𝐶𝑡
𝑁𝑃𝑊𝑡+𝑃𝑡
 
9. The consequences in pensions in payment and pensions rights in a year when the 
balance ratio in lower than 1, endure as long as the system’s assets cannot cover liabilities. 
Accordingly, the ABM is only deactivated when the balance index is higher than 1. 
10. Finally, the model only considers the new system’s liabilities, being all pension 
in payment due the old system financed by the State through the issuance of bonds. 
V. Results analysis 
                                                 
38 Instituto de Gestão de Fundos de Capitalização da Segurança Social. 
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The simulation results include an evaluation of the financial and social aspects of 
the Swedish NDC application in Portugal, first concerning model 1; and second 
considering model 2. 
Firstly, considering model 1, it can be observed that the ABM would not be 
activated in Portugal along the studied period (Appendix 2, table 2 and graphic 1). 
Alongside, the balance ratio lowest value is 1.09 in 2007, situation that is favorable to the 
country in comparison to the effective Swedish balance ratio – around 1.05 in 2001 and 
about 0.95 in 2008 (Orange Report, 2011). Considering the comparison between the 
simulation and the historical results, it is possible to observe through appendix 4, table 10 
and graphic 3, that the growth rate of the average pension in payment in the simulated 
model is always higher that the effective growth rate (11,75% and 3,68%, respectively); 
although, if we observe the absolute pension level, this conclusion goes on the opposite 
direction: effective pension’s level are higher than the simulated NDC pension - 428€ and 
121€, respectively. Moreover, if we consider the volatility of pensions, the simulated 
NDC scheme (3,0%) is slightly more volatile than the effective pensions (2,8%). 
Secondly, considering model 2, we can observe that the ABM would be activated 
between the period of 2010-2014 (appendix 2, table 3 and graphic 2). Despite this, the 
income growth rate is positive and sufficient to cover the balance ratio’s negative impact 
in pensions in payment, apart from 2013. Consequently, in 2013 pensions in payment 
decrease by 2.2% (3€) in comparison with a non-ABM activation – this is mostly due to 
the balance index of 0.82 in 2011 (Appendix 3, tables 4 to 6). In parallel, the same 
conclusions are withdrawn to pension rights, which in 2013 reveal an average decrease 
of 23.2%, in comparison with the situation of an inexistent ABM – the average NPW 
decrease from 31 377 to 23 418 euros, a 7 957 euros’ difference (Appendix 3, tables 7 to 
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9). However, in 2012 the balance index displays a value of 1.05, allowing pension rights 
to increase by 24.1%, on average, in 2014- in 2015 the ABM would be deactivated due 
the higher than one balance index value in 2013. Additionally, it is important to refer that 
the considered balance ratio’s value for 2011 and 2012 are highly influenced by the 
reserve fund’s rate of return: -13.39% and 20.64%, respectively. Considering the 
comparison between the new system’s introduction and the historical scheme’s, it is 
possible to observe through the growth rate of the simulated pension is always higher than 
the effective pension, apart from 2013. (Appendix 4, table 11 and graphic 4): 11,62% and 
3,68%, respectively. However, it should be recorded that the simulated absolute average 
pension level is lower than the effective pension: 116€ and 428€, respectively; and the 
historical pension is much less volatile (2,8%) than the simulated one (7,1%). Due this, 
old-age people face some unpredictability in their pension’s level, never truly knowing if 
it is going to decrease or increase next year. 
In light of both models results, the Portuguese context should be considered: the 
effective average old-age pension between 2001 and 2014 is 428.93€, a value that is 
considered low given that the national minimum wage, in 2014, was of 485€39 40. Thus, 
the simulated NDC scheme would produce much lower pension, as it would reach, at 
maximum, 200€ with model 1 and 188€ with model 2. 
Additionally, it is equally important to state the expected impact of the NDC model 
in Portugal when considering other social indicators, as well as its position in relation to 
Sweden, EU and the EMU. Firstly, considering the S80/S20 (appendix 5, graphic 5) and 
the Gini coefficient (appendix 5, graphic 6), the lower simulated pensions in payment 
                                                 
39 Source: Pordata (http://www.pordata.pt/DB/Portugal/Ambiente+de+Consulta/Tabela). 
40 Although in 2014 the average effective pension is 500.81€, slightly above the minimum wage. 
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than the historical level would conduce to the increase of the Portuguese recorded values, 
situation that would conduce to higher income disparities between the population as well 
as increasing the gap with Sweden, EMU’s and EU. Secondly, regarding the population 
at risk of poverty over 65 years, a deterioration of it would be expected – in historical 
data (appendix 5, graphic 7), Portugal displays a higher proportion that the other studied 
regions, about 22.8%, on average, while Sweden and the EMU registered 17.1%. 
Likewise, the old-age dependency ratio (appendix 5, graphic 8) would also increase, 
situation that would most probably drive Portugal (26.77) to similar average values of 
Sweden (27.81) and EMU (26.81)41 . In this sense, it is already forecasted a higher 
increase in the old-age dependency ratio for Portugal than for the other regions (appendix 
5, graphic 9) therefore, considering the smaller impact of the NDC system in pensions 
increase than the current scheme, it would be expected an even higher increase in the 
Portuguese forecasted old-age dependency ratio. 
Concerning the financial implications of the NDC scheme introduction, it is utterly 
important to understand what happened in Sweden to better realize what could be 
expected to occur in Portugal. In this sense, it is analyzed in first place the social security 
scheme’s administration cost. Through appendix 6, graphics 10 and 11, it is concluded 
that the adoption of the NDC scheme in 1999 conduced, irreversibly, to the increase in 
administrative costs from 0.4% of the GDP in 1998 to a permanent value around 0.6%, 
as well as an enormous increase in administrative costs per inhabitant42 from 110 euros 
in 1997 to around 200 euros from 2001 until 2013. A consequence of the increase in 
administrative costs is the loss of resources that could be allocated to each person’s 
pension, which could increase it. Conversely, the cost with old age pensions remained 
                                                 
41 Although Portugal exhibits lower old-age dependency values, it displays an increase tend 
42 Values in constant prices of 2005. 
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stable in Sweden from 1999 until 2008 (around 8% of the GDP), increasing afterwards – 
this is partially due the contraction of the growth rate of GDP (appendix 7, graphic 13) – 
while in Portugal it always increased rapidly through the studied period of 1998 – 2013 
(appendix 6, graphic 12). 
In sum, the adoption of the Swedish NDC model in Portugal would be financially 
viable, given it would always adapt the system in face of shortfalls and Sweden proved 
this scheme stabilizes expenses with pensions. However, concerning the social 
consequences, it would deteriorate the already low current and also future pensioners’ 
life-conditions, being, therefore, not socially viable. 
VI. Limitations and future research 
It is worldwide recognized the real-world complexity cannot ever be included in 
any simulation model, mostly due to the uncertainty factor as well as all other variables 
that can affect the results that are unmeasurable, e.g. people expectations. Therefore, 
models are produced with limitations and the simulation produced in chapter four is no 
exception. 
The lack of available data conducted to the assumption of a set of hypothesis which 
do not exactly correspond to reality and limit the model: a) generally, and especially after 
the 2008 financial crisis, people exhibit broken careers and so, it is a too optimistic 
assumption to consider that people have a ‘non-stoppable’ career; b) to simplify the 
calculations it was used the most recent mortality table (2013-2015) throughout the 
studied period, although it should have been used the biennial mortality tables provided 
by INE to produce more accurate results considering the demographic effect on pension 
rights and pension in payment; c) the 1999’s initial capital transferred to the buffer fund 
represents the effective public pension reserve fund value of 2001 – therefore, the balance 
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ratio values are slightly biased; d) the use of the general contribution rate of 16% as the 
universal rate, as well as the number of employees instead of the number of active 
beneficiaries produced overestimated results in the sense that the contribution rate is not 
the same for all sectors of activity; e) it is assumed that all individual from the age of 71 
or more retired at the age of 65 years old, while, in fact, the majority of them most 
probably retired earlier; f) in face of the previous limitation’s conclusion, it is therefore 
noted the simulated models do not allow for a flexible retirement age as the Swedish NDC 
system; and g) the non-consideration of pension rights and pensions in payment under the 
old system on the model allows for balance ratio’s values higher than one, otherwise they 
would often be lower. 
Secondly, future research could use the effective Portuguese contribution rate in the 
simulation, which is lower than the general 34.75% and higher than the Swedish rate of 
16%. However, it can be expected the conclusions will not be different given that, in one 
hand it is true the system’s assets increase but, on the other hand liabilities also increase. 
Moreover, it could be simulated a theoretical model where the Portuguese system would 
keep its characteristics of a DB and PAYG scheme but a mandatory complementary 
system resembling the Swedish NDC model would be implemented. However, it can be 
argued this would create an overburden in contributors, although it would also allow 
higher pensions. 
VII. Conclusion 
Since the birth of public pension system much has been discussed whether this 
should aim a given benefit at retirement or a contribution rate should be formulated in 
advance and, even if each individual should save for their own retirement or younger 
generations should support the pensioners’ benefits. In this topic, a consensus will never 
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be reached, as beneath each position lie different normative approaches. From time to 
time the predominant current is a DB and PAYG system, being in the other moments the 
FDC scheme the premier current. More recently, a mix of these combinations was 
formulated, fevering even more the discussion on the best model to follow. Whenever a 
current is worldwide predominant, countries using other schemes suffer internal and 
external pressures to change it. In this sense, Portugal presents itself as an example of a 
country suffering from these pressures since the beginning of the 21st century. Most 
authors arguing the Portuguese social security system is not sustainable present as a 
solution the adoption of an NDC scheme in order to face the significant forecasted 
decrease in fertility rates and anemic/stagnation economic growth. Moreover, before the 
2008 crises, the Swedish NDC scheme was the prevailing pointed model to follow. The 
crises and the subsequent years proved the Swedish system was not as robust as believed 
and nowadays authors propose more conservative NDC schemes. It is in this frame that 
this Master Final Work was developed: to perceive the suitability of the Swedish pension 
system in the Portuguese case – an historical approach since 1999. The study’s conclusion 
proved that in financial terms the system would always endure as it would adjust 
automatically in face of shortfalls. However, and keeping in mind the several claims that 
pensions are very low, the adoption of the Swedish NDC scheme would have caused 
lower pensions. Therefore, it would have not prevented people to afford better life-
conditions and abandon a situation of at-risk-of poverty. Once more, what is most 
important remains a normative issue of each individual. In this sense, and in face of this 
study, my personal opinion is that an NDC system should not be adopted and parametrical 
reforms should take place throughout time, given that it would be naïve to consider the 
current situation would endure.  
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Appendix 1 – Global formation tax 
 
Share Indexed reference remuneration to the indexante dos 
apoios sociais – IAS 
Rates 
1 Up to 1.1xIAS 2.3% 
2 Above 1.1 x IAS until 2 x IAS 2.25% 
3 Above 2 x IAS until 4 x IAS 2.2% 
4 Above 4 x IAS until 8 x IAS 2.1% 
5 Above 8 x IAS 2% 
Table 1 – Annual tax rate to be considered in the accrual tax rate to the calculation of the Global formation tax. Source: Social security website. 
Appendix 2 – Simulation results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphic 1 –Model 1: Evolution of balance ratio value between 1999 and 2014. Source: Author’s calculations. 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Historical real rate of return of the social security reserve 
fund ------ 1,63% 0,95% -0,20% 4,46% 3,45% 4,44% 3,20% 0,98% -5,35% 5,28% -2,08% -13,39% 20,64% 5,97% 14,74%
F (without the inicial capital) 3 554 319 100
C 5 836 477 920 6 288 812 300 6 837 814 185 7 307 775 287 7 593 039 686 7 954 268 332 8 312 257 188 8 717 944 435 9 074 039 412 9 664 070 349 9 655 177 840 9 864 201 984 9 610 192 502 9 310 159 690 9 043 771 744 9 166 537 632
Assets: F and C capitalized (at the real rate of return and 
including the initial capital) 13 189 437 020 19 795 744 784 26 886 577 778 34 125 964 360 43 579 671 626 53 311 860 887 64 360 228 918 75 416 674 900 85 318 723 313 89 901 214 201 104 812 969 540 112 291 886 357 105 579 390 500 138 602 753 349 156 461 022 641 190 041 062 657
NPW 5 826 684 923 12 401 042 400 19 890 498 961 28 245 915 282 36 992 082 845 46 162 673 697 56 034 822 453 67 249 272 123 78 347 275 940 90 323 172 987 100 466 457 690 110 666 338 925 119 035 642 409 122 812 914 812 128 261 548 212 137 096 433 555
P 0 606 518 342 999 283 226 462 209 1 266 524 2 397 057 970 647 1 439 029 970 249 1 362 171 1 671 505 3 791 619 3 388 820 1 923 926 310 986
b (without the ABM activation) ---- 1,60 1,35 1,21 1,18 1,15 1,15 1,12 1,09 1,12 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11
balance index ---- 1,60 1,35 1,21 1,18 1,15 1,15 1,12 1,09 1,12 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11
Table 2 – Model 1: Evolution of the balance ration value and its rubrics between 1999 and 2014. Values in euros. Source: author’s calculations and Conta da Segurança Social 2014. 
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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Historical real rate of return of the 
social security reserve fund
(relatório e contas da segurança social ------ 1,63% 0,95% -0,20% 4,46% 3,45% 4,44% 3,20% 0,98% -5,35% 5,28% -2,08% -13,39% 20,64% 5,97% 14,74%
F (without the inicial capital) 3 554 319 100
C 5 836 477 920 6 288 812 300 6 837 814 185 7 307 775 287 7 593 039 686 7 954 268 332 8 312 257 188 8 717 944 435 9 074 039 412 9 664 070 349 9 655 177 840 9 864 201 984 9 610 192 502 9 310 159 690 9 043 771 744 9 166 537 632
Assets: F and C capitalized (at the real 
rate of return and including the initial 
capital) 13 189 437 020 19 795 744 784 26 886 577 778 34 125 964 360 43 579 671 626 53 311 860 887 64 360 228 918 75 416 674 900 85 318 723 313 89 901 214 201 104 812 969 540 112 291 886 357 105 579 390 500 138 602 753 349 156 461 022 641 190 041 062 657
NPW 5 826 684 923 12 401 042 400 19 890 498 961 28 245 915 282 36 992 082 845 46 162 673 697 56 034 822 453 67 249 272 123 78 347 275 940 90 323 172 987 100 466 457 690 115 231 761 825 128 922 289 909 133 597 423 247 114 419 985 773 129 148 065 416
P 0 606 518 342 999 283 226 462 209 1 266 524 2 397 057 970 647 1 439 029 970 249 1 362 171 1 740 248 4 119 017 3 716 873 1 739 858 294 663
b (without the ABM activation) ---- 1,60 1,35 1,21 1,18 1,15 1,15 1,12 1,09 0,9953 1,04 0,97 0,82 1,04 1,37 1,47
balance index ---- 1,60 1,35 1,21 1,18 1,15 1,15 1,12 1,09 1,04 1,04 1,01 0,82 1,05 1,37 1,47
Table 3 – Model 2: Evolution of the balance ration value and its rubrics between 1999 and 2014. Values in euros. Source: author’s calculations and Conta da Segurança Social 2014. 
Graphic 2 – Model 2: Evolution of balance ratio value between 1999 and 2014. Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Appendix 3 – Impact of the ABM activation on pension rights and in 
payment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 – Model 2: Annual pensions in payment due the new system with the ABM activation. Source: Author’s calculations. 
Annual pensions in payment by age due the new system (in euros)
Age/year 1 999 2 000 2 001 2 002 2 003 2 004 2 005 2 006 2 007 2 008 2 009 2 010 2 011 2 012 2 013 2 014
55 0 43 67 92 121 151 182 224 248 282 323 379 442 481 434 484
56 0 43 44 70 96 124 154 186 227 250 290 341 403 442 394 447
57 0 43 44 46 73 98 127 157 188 229 257 306 363 404 362 406
58 0 43 44 46 48 74 100 129 159 190 236 271 325 363 331 372
59 0 43 44 46 48 49 76 102 131 160 195 249 289 325 298 340
60 0 43 44 46 48 49 50 78 103 132 165 206 265 289 267 306
61 0 43 44 46 48 49 50 51 78 104 136 174 219 265 237 274
62 0 43 44 46 48 49 50 51 51 79 107 143 185 219 217 243
63 0 0 44 46 47 49 50 51 51 52 82 113 152 185 180 223
64 0 0 0 46 47 49 50 51 51 52 53 86 120 152 152 185
65 0 0 0 0 47 48 50 51 51 52 53 56 91 120 125 156
66 0 0 0 0 0 48 50 51 51 52 53 56 60 92 99 128
67 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 50 51 52 53 56 60 60 75 101
68 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 51 52 53 56 60 60 49 77
69 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51 52 53 56 60 60 49 50
70 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 52 53 56 60 60 49 50
71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53 56 60 60 49 50
72 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 60 60 49 50
73 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 60 49 50
74 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 49 50
75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49 50
76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50
77 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
78 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
81 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
82 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
83 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
84 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
88 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
92 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
93 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
94 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
96 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
98 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Average 43 46 53 61 70 80 91 103 115 130 151 175 191 170 188
Table 5 – Model 2: Annual pensions in payment due the new system without the ABM activation. Source: Author’s calculations. 
Annual pensions in payment by age due the new system (in euros)
Age/year 1 999 2 000 2 001 2 002 2 003 2 004 2 005 2 006 2 007 2 008 2 009 2 010 2 011 2 012 2 013 2 014
55 0 43 67 92 121 151 182 224 248 282 323 379 442 481 434 484
56 0 43 44 70 96 124 154 186 227 250 290 322 381 431 403 408
57 0 43 44 46 73 98 127 157 188 229 257 289 342 394 370 370
58 0 43 44 46 48 74 100 129 159 190 236 256 307 354 338 340
59 0 43 44 46 48 49 76 102 131 160 195 235 272 317 304 311
60 0 43 44 46 48 49 50 78 103 132 165 195 250 281 273 280
61 0 43 44 46 48 49 50 51 78 104 136 165 207 258 242 251
62 0 43 44 46 48 49 50 51 51 79 107 135 175 214 222 222
63 0 0 44 46 47 49 50 51 51 52 82 107 144 181 184 204
64 0 0 0 46 47 49 50 51 51 52 53 81 113 148 155 169
65 0 0 0 0 47 48 50 51 51 52 53 53 86 117 128 143
66 0 0 0 0 0 48 50 51 51 52 53 53 56 89 101 117
67 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 50 51 52 53 53 56 58 77 93
68 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 51 52 53 53 56 58 50 70
69 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51 52 53 53 56 58 50 46
70 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 52 53 53 56 58 50 46
71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53 53 56 58 50 46
72 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53 56 58 50 46
73 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 58 50 46
74 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 58 50 46
75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 46
76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46
77 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
78 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
81 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
82 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
83 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
84 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
88 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
92 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
93 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
94 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
96 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
98 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Average 43 46 53 61 70 80 91 103 115 130 144 167 187 173 174
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Table 6 – Model 2: Relative impact of the ABM activation on pensions in payment due the new system. Source: Author’s 
calculations. 
Relative impact of the ABM activation
Annual pensions in payment by age due the new system (in euros)
Age/year 1 999 2 000 2 001 2 002 2 003 2 004 2 005 2 006 2 007 2 008 2 009 2 010 2 011 2 012 2 013 2 014
55 ----- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
56 ----- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -2,2% 9,5%
57 ----- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -2,2% 9,5%
58 ----- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -2,2% 9,5%
59 ----- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -2,2% 9,5%
60 ----- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -2,2% 9,5%
61 ----- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -2,2% 9,5%
62 ----- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -2,2% 9,5%
63 ----- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -2,2% 9,5%
64 ----- ----- ----- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -2,2% 9,5%
65 ----- ----- ----- ----- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -2,2% 9,5%
66 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -2,2% 9,5%
67 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -2,2% 9,5%
68 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -2,2% 9,5%
69 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -2,2% 9,5%
70 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -2,2% 9,5%
71 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -2,2% 9,5%
72 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -2,2% 9,5%
73 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 6,0% 2,6% -2,2% 9,5%
74 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 2,6% -2,2% 9,5%
75 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -2,2% 9,5%
76 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 9,5%
77 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
78 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
79 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
80 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
81 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
82 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
83 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
84 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
85 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
86 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
87 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
88 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
89 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
90 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
91 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
92 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
93 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
94 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
95 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
96 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
97 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
98 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
99 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
100 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
Average ---- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -2,2% 9,5%
Table 7 – Model 2: NPW per age due the new system with the ABM activation. Source: Author’s calculations. 
NPW per age due the new system (in euros)
Age/year 1 999 2 000 2 001 2 002 2 003 2 004 2 005 2 006 2 007 2 008 2 009 2 010 2 011 2 012 2 013 2 014
15 1 313 1 371 1 452 1 534 1 593 1 655 1 713 1 762 1 805 1 888 1 943 2 013 2 027 2 047 2 041 2 037
16 1 313 2 732 2 883 3 073 3 213 3 309 3 431 3 534 3 617 3 738 3 918 4 176 4 291 4 128 3 388 4 267
17 1 313 2 732 4 304 4 588 4 838 4 991 5 148 5 312 5 440 5 594 5 852 6 291 6 628 6 429 5 120 5 673
18 1 313 2 732 4 303 6 093 6 438 6 678 6 894 7 089 7 267 7 461 7 793 8 362 8 913 8 804 7 035 7 482
19 1 313 2 731 4 303 6 092 8 027 8 338 8 645 8 895 9 094 9 333 9 745 10 439 11 151 11 126 9 012 9 482
20 1 313 2 731 4 302 6 092 8 026 9 988 10 369 10 707 10 952 11 205 11 702 12 529 13 396 13 400 10 945 11 547
21 1 313 2 731 4 302 6 091 8 025 9 987 12 081 12 490 12 814 13 107 13 659 14 625 15 654 15 682 12 838 13 565
22 1 313 2 731 4 302 6 091 8 025 9 986 12 080 14 262 14 649 15 016 15 649 16 720 17 919 17 977 14 737 15 542
23 1 313 2 731 4 302 6 091 8 025 9 986 12 079 14 261 16 470 16 895 17 644 18 850 20 183 20 279 16 648 17 526
24 1 313 2 731 4 302 6 091 8 025 9 986 12 079 14 260 16 469 18 761 19 609 20 987 22 485 22 580 18 564 19 522
25 1 313 2 731 4 302 6 091 8 024 9 985 12 079 14 259 16 468 18 759 21 559 23 089 24 793 24 919 20 479 21 522
26 1 313 2 731 4 302 6 091 8 024 9 985 12 078 14 258 16 467 18 758 21 557 25 177 27 064 27 264 22 425 23 522
27 1 313 2 731 4 302 6 090 8 023 9 984 12 077 14 257 16 465 18 755 21 555 25 174 29 319 29 571 24 376 25 554
28 1 313 2 731 4 301 6 090 8 023 9 983 12 076 14 256 16 464 18 754 21 552 25 171 29 315 31 862 26 296 27 590
29 1 313 2 731 4 301 6 089 8 022 9 982 12 074 14 253 16 461 18 750 21 548 25 166 29 309 31 855 28 201 29 593
30 1 313 2 731 4 301 6 089 8 021 9 981 12 073 14 252 16 459 18 748 21 546 25 163 29 305 31 851 28 196 31 584
31 1 313 2 731 4 301 6 089 8 021 9 981 12 073 14 252 16 458 18 747 21 545 25 161 29 303 31 848 28 193 31 580
32 1 313 2 731 4 301 6 089 8 021 9 980 12 072 14 250 16 457 18 745 21 542 25 158 29 299 31 843 28 189 31 574
33 1 313 2 730 4 301 6 088 8 020 9 979 12 071 14 249 16 455 18 743 21 539 25 154 29 295 31 838 28 184 31 569
34 1 312 2 730 4 300 6 088 8 020 9 978 12 069 14 247 16 452 18 740 21 535 25 150 29 289 31 832 28 178 31 562
35 1 312 2 730 4 299 6 086 8 018 9 976 12 066 14 243 16 448 18 734 21 529 25 142 29 280 31 821 28 169 31 551
36 1 312 2 730 4 299 6 086 8 016 9 974 12 064 14 241 16 445 18 731 21 524 25 136 29 273 31 813 28 161 31 543
37 1 312 2 730 4 299 6 085 8 015 9 972 12 062 14 238 16 441 18 726 21 519 25 129 29 264 31 804 28 153 31 533
38 1 312 2 729 4 298 6 083 8 013 9 969 12 058 14 233 16 435 18 719 21 510 25 119 29 252 31 790 28 140 31 518
39 1 312 2 729 4 297 6 082 8 011 9 966 12 054 14 227 16 429 18 712 21 501 25 108 29 239 31 775 28 126 31 502
40 1 312 2 728 4 296 6 081 8 009 9 964 12 051 14 223 16 423 18 705 21 494 25 099 29 227 31 762 28 114 31 488
41 1 311 2 727 4 295 6 078 8 005 9 959 12 044 14 215 16 413 18 693 21 478 25 081 29 206 31 737 28 092 31 463
42 1 311 2 727 4 293 6 076 8 002 9 954 12 037 14 206 16 403 18 680 21 463 25 063 29 184 31 713 28 070 31 438
43 1 311 2 726 4 292 6 073 7 998 9 948 12 030 14 197 16 391 18 666 21 447 25 042 29 159 31 685 28 044 31 409
44 1 311 2 725 4 290 6 071 7 994 9 943 12 022 14 188 16 379 18 652 21 430 25 021 29 133 31 656 28 017 31 378
45 1 311 2 725 4 289 6 068 7 990 9 937 12 015 14 177 16 367 18 637 21 411 24 998 29 105 31 624 27 988 31 345
46 1 310 2 723 4 287 6 065 7 984 9 929 12 004 14 164 16 350 18 617 21 387 24 968 29 069 31 583 27 951 31 302
47 1 310 2 723 4 285 6 061 7 979 9 922 11 994 14 151 16 334 18 597 21 362 24 939 29 033 31 542 27 913 31 258
48 1 310 2 722 4 284 6 059 7 975 9 916 11 986 14 140 16 320 18 580 21 341 24 912 29 000 31 504 27 878 31 218
49 1 309 2 721 4 282 6 056 7 970 9 909 11 976 14 127 16 303 18 559 21 315 24 880 28 960 31 459 27 836 31 170
50 1 309 2 720 4 279 6 052 7 964 9 900 11 964 14 111 16 284 18 535 21 286 24 844 28 916 31 409 27 790 31 116
51 1 309 2 719 4 277 6 048 7 958 9 891 11 953 14 097 16 265 18 512 21 258 24 809 28 872 31 358 27 743 31 062
52 1 308 2 717 4 273 6 041 7 949 9 879 11 936 14 076 16 239 18 481 21 220 24 762 28 815 31 293 27 682 30 992
53 1 308 2 716 4 271 6 037 7 942 9 869 11 923 14 058 16 217 18 453 21 186 24 720 28 763 31 234 27 627 30 928
54 1 308 2 715 4 269 6 033 7 935 9 859 11 910 14 041 16 195 18 426 21 153 24 678 28 712 31 174 27 571 30 864
55 1 307 2 670 4 198 5 757 7 579 9 428 11 389 14 017 15 480 17 597 20 217 23 696 27 600 30 071 27 148 30 280
56 1 306 2 669 4 174 5 751 7 357 9 130 11 017 13 476 15 535 16 950 19 436 22 750 26 626 29 022 26 257 29 867
57 1 306 2 668 4 171 5 792 7 420 8 970 10 783 13 091 15 061 17 092 18 850 22 002 25 666 28 116 25 410 28 980
58 1 306 2 666 4 168 5 787 7 530 9 102 10 684 12 844 14 741 16 684 19 076 21 454 24 938 27 188 24 673 28 122
59 1 305 2 665 4 166 5 783 7 523 9 283 10 891 12 741 14 564 16 439 18 735 21 779 24 437 26 529 23 929 27 386
60 1 304 2 663 4 162 5 776 7 514 9 270 11 140 12 945 14 522 16 327 18 551 21 484 24 857 26 085 23 393 26 630
61 1 304 2 661 4 157 5 768 7 502 9 254 11 119 13 194 14 796 16 350 18 503 21 355 24 609 26 571 23 036 26 090
62 0 2 659 4 153 5 762 7 492 9 239 11 100 13 169 15 118 16 700 18 600 21 378 24 549 26 391 23 448 25 745
63 0 0 4 151 5 756 7 483 9 226 11 082 13 145 15 088 17 099 19 035 21 550 24 648 26 398 23 323 26 187
64 0 0 0 5 748 7 470 9 208 11 058 13 114 15 050 17 052 19 506 22 068 24 885 26 547 23 331 26 074
65 0 0 0 0 7 455 9 188 11 031 13 079 15 007 17 000 19 443 22 624 25 498 26 835 23 457 26 091
66 0 0 0 0 0 9 166 11 002 13 042 14 961 16 944 19 375 22 541 26 151 27 502 23 700 26 233
67 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 972 13 004 14 912 16 885 19 304 22 453 26 043 28 207 24 252 26 493
68 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 947 14 844 16 803 19 205 22 334 25 899 28 044 24 806 27 037
69 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 772 16 717 19 101 22 206 25 745 27 871 24 647 27 609
70 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 618 18 982 22 062 25 570 27 674 24 467 27 403
Average 1 311 2 689 4 184 5 835 7 579 9 304 11 107 13 005 14 813 16 646 18 870 21 745 24 966 26 749 23 418 25 975
 46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 – Model 2: NPW per age due the new system without the ABM activation. Source: Author’s calculations. 
NPW per age due the new system (in euros)
Age/year 1 999 2 000 2 001 2 002 2 003 2 004 2 005 2 006 2 007 2 008 2 009 2 010 2 011 2 012 2 013 2 014
15 1 313 1 371 1 452 1 534 1 593 1 655 1 713 1 762 1 805 1 888 1 943 2 013 2 027 2 047 2 041 2 037
16 1 313 2 732 2 883 3 073 3 213 3 309 3 431 3 534 3 617 3 738 3 918 3 949 4 048 4 023 2 444 1 918
17 1 313 2 732 4 304 4 588 4 838 4 991 5 148 5 312 5 440 5 594 5 852 5 948 6 254 6 266 4 927 3 182
18 1 313 2 732 4 303 6 093 6 438 6 678 6 894 7 089 7 267 7 461 7 793 7 906 8 410 8 581 7 674 4 809
19 1 313 2 731 4 303 6 092 8 027 8 338 8 645 8 895 9 094 9 333 9 745 9 870 10 521 10 844 10 510 6 608
20 1 313 2 731 4 302 6 092 8 026 9 988 10 369 10 707 10 952 11 205 11 702 11 846 12 640 13 061 13 282 8 466
21 1 313 2 731 4 302 6 091 8 025 9 987 12 081 12 490 12 814 13 107 13 659 13 827 14 770 15 284 15 996 10 281
22 1 313 2 731 4 302 6 091 8 025 9 986 12 080 14 262 14 649 15 016 15 649 15 808 16 907 17 521 18 719 12 059
23 1 313 2 731 4 302 6 091 8 025 9 986 12 079 14 261 16 470 16 895 17 644 17 822 19 043 19 765 21 459 13 843
24 1 313 2 731 4 302 6 091 8 025 9 986 12 079 14 260 16 469 18 761 19 609 19 842 21 216 22 008 24 207 15 638
25 1 313 2 731 4 302 6 091 8 024 9 985 12 079 14 259 16 468 18 759 21 559 21 830 23 393 24 287 26 954 17 438
26 1 313 2 731 4 302 6 091 8 024 9 985 12 078 14 258 16 467 18 758 21 557 23 804 25 536 26 573 29 746 19 237
27 1 313 2 731 4 302 6 090 8 023 9 984 12 077 14 257 16 465 18 755 21 555 23 801 27 664 28 822 32 545 21 065
28 1 313 2 731 4 301 6 090 8 023 9 983 12 076 14 256 16 464 18 754 21 552 23 798 27 660 31 055 35 300 22 898
29 1 313 2 731 4 301 6 089 8 022 9 982 12 074 14 253 16 461 18 750 21 548 23 793 27 654 31 048 38 034 24 702
30 1 313 2 731 4 301 6 089 8 021 9 981 12 073 14 252 16 459 18 748 21 546 23 790 27 651 31 043 38 026 26 490
31 1 313 2 731 4 301 6 089 8 021 9 981 12 073 14 252 16 458 18 747 21 545 23 789 27 649 31 041 38 021 26 486
32 1 313 2 731 4 301 6 089 8 021 9 980 12 072 14 250 16 457 18 745 21 542 23 786 27 645 31 036 38 017 26 484
33 1 313 2 730 4 301 6 088 8 020 9 979 12 071 14 249 16 455 18 743 21 539 23 782 27 641 31 031 38 012 26 479
34 1 312 2 730 4 300 6 088 8 020 9 978 12 069 14 247 16 452 18 740 21 535 23 778 27 635 31 025 38 006 26 475
35 1 312 2 730 4 299 6 086 8 018 9 976 12 066 14 243 16 448 18 734 21 529 23 771 27 627 31 015 37 998 26 470
36 1 312 2 730 4 299 6 086 8 016 9 974 12 064 14 241 16 445 18 731 21 524 23 765 27 620 31 007 37 986 26 461
37 1 312 2 730 4 299 6 085 8 015 9 972 12 062 14 238 16 441 18 726 21 519 23 759 27 612 30 998 37 976 26 454
38 1 312 2 729 4 298 6 083 8 013 9 969 12 058 14 233 16 435 18 719 21 510 23 749 27 600 30 984 37 965 26 445
39 1 312 2 729 4 297 6 082 8 011 9 966 12 054 14 227 16 429 18 712 21 501 23 739 27 588 30 969 37 948 26 434
40 1 312 2 728 4 296 6 081 8 009 9 964 12 051 14 223 16 423 18 705 21 494 23 730 27 577 30 957 37 930 26 420
41 1 311 2 727 4 295 6 078 8 005 9 959 12 044 14 215 16 413 18 693 21 478 23 713 27 556 30 933 37 914 26 409
42 1 311 2 727 4 293 6 076 8 002 9 954 12 037 14 206 16 403 18 680 21 463 23 696 27 536 30 909 37 886 26 388
43 1 311 2 726 4 292 6 073 7 998 9 948 12 030 14 197 16 391 18 666 21 447 23 676 27 513 30 882 37 856 26 367
44 1 311 2 725 4 290 6 071 7 994 9 943 12 022 14 188 16 379 18 652 21 430 23 656 27 488 30 854 37 823 26 344
45 1 311 2 725 4 289 6 068 7 990 9 937 12 015 14 177 16 367 18 637 21 411 23 635 27 462 30 822 37 788 26 318
46 1 310 2 723 4 287 6 065 7 984 9 929 12 004 14 164 16 350 18 617 21 387 23 607 27 428 30 783 37 750 26 291
47 1 310 2 723 4 285 6 061 7 979 9 922 11 994 14 151 16 334 18 597 21 362 23 578 27 393 30 742 37 701 26 256
48 1 310 2 722 4 284 6 059 7 975 9 916 11 986 14 140 16 320 18 580 21 341 23 553 27 362 30 706 37 652 26 220
49 1 309 2 721 4 282 6 056 7 970 9 909 11 976 14 127 16 303 18 559 21 315 23 523 27 325 30 662 37 607 26 187
50 1 309 2 720 4 279 6 052 7 964 9 900 11 964 14 111 16 284 18 535 21 286 23 489 27 284 30 613 37 554 26 148
51 1 309 2 719 4 277 6 048 7 958 9 891 11 953 14 097 16 265 18 512 21 258 23 456 27 242 30 564 37 494 26 104
52 1 308 2 717 4 273 6 041 7 949 9 879 11 936 14 076 16 239 18 481 21 220 23 411 27 188 30 500 37 433 26 060
53 1 308 2 716 4 271 6 037 7 942 9 869 11 923 14 058 16 217 18 453 21 186 23 372 27 139 30 442 37 355 26 003
54 1 308 2 715 4 269 6 033 7 935 9 859 11 910 14 041 16 195 18 426 21 153 23 332 27 090 30 384 37 284 25 952
55 1 307 2 670 4 198 5 757 7 579 9 428 11 389 14 017 15 480 17 597 20 217 22 404 26 042 29 309 37 213 25 899
56 1 306 2 669 4 174 5 751 7 357 9 130 11 017 13 476 15 535 16 950 19 436 21 510 25 123 28 287 35 897 25 501
57 1 306 2 668 4 171 5 792 7 420 8 970 10 783 13 091 15 061 17 092 18 850 20 802 24 217 27 403 34 645 24 665
58 1 306 2 666 4 168 5 787 7 530 9 102 10 684 12 844 14 741 16 684 19 076 20 284 23 530 26 498 33 563 23 870
59 1 305 2 665 4 166 5 783 7 523 9 283 10 891 12 741 14 564 16 439 18 735 20 591 23 057 25 856 32 454 23 177
60 1 304 2 663 4 162 5 776 7 514 9 270 11 140 12 945 14 522 16 327 18 551 20 312 23 454 25 424 31 668 22 478
61 1 304 2 661 4 157 5 768 7 502 9 254 11 119 13 194 14 796 16 350 18 503 20 191 23 220 25 898 31 138 21 974
62 0 2 659 4 153 5 762 7 492 9 239 11 100 13 169 15 118 16 700 18 600 20 212 23 163 25 722 31 719 21 639
63 0 0 4 151 5 756 7 483 9 226 11 082 13 145 15 088 17 099 19 035 20 374 23 256 25 729 31 504 22 026
64 0 0 0 5 748 7 470 9 208 11 058 13 114 15 050 17 052 19 506 20 864 23 480 25 874 31 512 21 909
65 0 0 0 0 7 455 9 188 11 031 13 079 15 007 17 000 19 443 21 390 24 059 26 155 31 689 21 916
66 0 0 0 0 0 9 166 11 002 13 042 14 961 16 944 19 375 21 311 24 674 26 805 32 033 22 035
67 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 972 13 004 14 912 16 885 19 304 21 228 24 573 27 492 32 830 22 263
68 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 947 14 844 16 803 19 205 21 115 24 436 27 334 33 671 22 781
69 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 772 16 717 19 101 20 995 24 291 27 164 33 477 23 302
70 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 618 18 982 20 859 24 126 26 972 33 270 23 153
Average 1 311 2 689 4 184 5 835 7 579 9 304 11 107 13 005 14 813 16 646 18 870 20 561 23 559 26 072 31 377 21 623
Table 9 – Model 2: Relative impact of the ABM activation on NPW due the new system. Source: Author’s calculations. 
Relative impact of the ABM activation
NPW per age due the new system (in euros)
Age/year 1 999 2 000 2 001 2 002 2 003 2 004 2 005 2 006 2 007 2 008 2 009 2 010 2 011 2 012 2 013 2 014
15 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
16 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% 38,6% 122,5%
17 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% 3,9% 78,3%
18 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -8,3% 55,6%
19 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -14,2% 43,5%
20 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -17,6% 36,4%
21 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -19,7% 31,9%
22 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -21,3% 28,9%
23 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -22,4% 26,6%
24 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -23,3% 24,8%
25 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -24,0% 23,4%
26 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -24,6% 22,3%
27 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -25,1% 21,3%
28 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -25,5% 20,5%
29 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -25,9% 19,8%
30 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -25,8% 19,2%
31 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -25,8% 19,2%
32 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -25,9% 19,2%
33 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -25,9% 19,2%
34 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -25,9% 19,2%
35 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -25,9% 19,2%
36 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -25,9% 19,2%
37 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -25,9% 19,2%
38 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -25,9% 19,2%
39 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -25,9% 19,2%
40 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -25,9% 19,2%
41 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -25,9% 19,1%
42 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -25,9% 19,1%
43 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -25,9% 19,1%
44 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -25,9% 19,1%
45 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -25,9% 19,1%
46 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,0% 19,1%
47 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,0% 19,1%
48 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,0% 19,1%
49 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,0% 19,0%
50 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,0% 19,0%
51 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,0% 19,0%
52 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,0% 18,9%
53 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,0% 18,9%
54 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,1% 18,9%
55 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -27,0% 16,9%
56 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,9% 17,1%
57 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,7% 17,5%
58 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,5% 17,8%
59 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,3% 18,2%
60 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,1% 18,5%
61 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,0% 18,7%
62 ---- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,1% 19,0%
63 ---- ---- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,0% 18,9%
64 ---- ---- ---- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,0% 19,0%
65 ---- ---- ---- ---- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,0% 19,1%
66 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,0% 19,1%
67 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,1% 19,0%
68 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,3% 18,7%
69 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,4% 18,5%
70 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -26,5% 18,4%
Average 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 6,0% 2,6% -23,2% 24,1%
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Appendix 4 – Impact of the NDC scheme’s introduction on pensions in payment and its comparison with historical results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 – Model 1: Comparison of the volatility of the average monthly pension in payment with the effective monthly pension. Source: Author’s calculations and PORDATA. 
Table 11 – Model 2: Comparison of the volatility of the average monthly pension in payment with the effective monthly pension. Source: Author’s calculations and PORDATA. 
Notes: 
(1) Considers the annual average pension divided by 12 months; Source: Conta da Segurança Social 2014, page 275 
(2) Considers only pensions derived from the new scheme (Swedish NDC) 
 The level of historical and simulated pension cannot be compared, as one system is already in a mature state and the other is still growing (consequently pensions are also increasing with the number of years of contributions) 
Rubric/year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total average Volatility
Effective pension in euros (1) 314,62 334,02 351,51 373,72 394,73 417,86 436,72 454,24 472,08 482,86 487,89 472,18 497,81 500,81 427,93
Growth rate of the effective pension 6,2% 5,2% 6,3% 5,6% 5,9% 4,5% 4,0% 3,9% 2,3% 1,0% -3,2% 5,4% 0,6% 3,676% 2,8%
Simulated NDC pension in euros (2) 46 53 61 70 80 91 103 115 130 145 161 174 188 199 120,77
Growth rate of the simulated NDC pension 13,7% 15,4% 14,3% 14,5% 14,7% 12,6% 11,7% 13,5% 11,1% 11,4% 7,8% 8,0% 6,1% 11,750% 3,0%
Average monthly old-age pension
Notes: 
(1) Considers the annual average pension divided by 12 months; Source: Conta da Segurança Social 2014, page 275 
(2) Considers only pensions derived from the new scheme (Swedish NDC) 
 The level of historical and simulated pension cannot be compared, as one system is already in a mature state and the other is still growing (consequently 
pensions are also increasing with the number of years of contributions) 
Rubric/year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total average Volatility
Effective pension (1) 314,62 334,02 351,51 373,72 394,73 417,86 436,72 454,24 472,08 482,86 487,89 472,18 497,81 500,81 427,93
Growth rate of the effective pension 6,2% 5,2% 6,3% 5,6% 5,9% 4,5% 4,0% 3,9% 2,3% 1,0% -3,2% 5,4% 0,6% 3,676% 2,7%
Simulated NDC pension (2) 0 43 46 53 61 70 80 91 103 115 130 151 175 191 170 188 116,00
Growth rate of the simulated NDC pension 13,7% 15,4% 14,3% 14,5% 14,7% 12,6% 11,7% 13,5% 15,7% 16,2% 8,8% -11,1% 11,1% 11,621% 7,1%
Average monthly old-age pension
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Appendix 5 – Evolution of historical social indicators in Portugal, Sweden, 
EU and EMU 
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Graphic 5 – S80/S20 income quintile share ratio in Portugal, Sweden, EU and EMU between 1995 and 2014. 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
Observation: EU data available between 2010 and 2014 – values equal to the EMU’s. 
Graphic 6 – Gini coefficient in Portugal, Sweden, EU and EMU between 1995 and 2014. Source: EUROSTAT. 
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Graphic 3 – Model 1: Evolution of the average effective and simulated NDC pensions in payment. Source: 
Author’s calculation 
Graphic 4 – Model 2: Evolution of the average effective and simulated NDC pensions in payment. Source: Author’s 
calculations. 
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Graphic 8 – Old-age dependency ratio in Portugal, Sweden, EU and EMU between 1960 and 2014. Source: EUROSTAT. 
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Appendix 6 – Evolution of social security financial indicators in Portugal, 
Sweden, EU and EMU 
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Graphic 7 – People at risk of poverty over 65 years old (% of total population) in Portugal, Sweden, EU and EMU between 
2004 and 2014. Source: EUROSTAT. 
Graphic 9 – Forecast of old-age dependency ratio in Portugal, Sweden, EU and Emu between 2015 and 2080. Source: 
EUROSTAT. 
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Graphic 10 – Social security scheme’s administrative expenses (% of GDP) in Portugal, Sweden, EU and EMU between 
1993 and 2013. Source: EUROSTAT. 
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Appendix 7 – Evolution of economic indicators in Portugal, Sweden, EU 
and EMU 
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Graphic 11 - Social security scheme’s administrative expenses (euros per inhabitant) in Portugal, Sweden, EU and EMU 
between 1993 and 2013. Source: EUROSTAT. 
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Graphic 12 – Evolution of costs with old-age pensions (% of GDP) in Portugal, Sweden, EU and EMU between 
1993 and 2013. Source: EUROSTAT. 
Graphic 13 – GDP growth rate in Portugal, Sweden, EU and EMU between 1994 and 2015. Source: Author’s 
calculations based in EUROSTAT GDP at 2005 constant prices. 
